Elizabeth Stanley (changed at author's request)
POLS 398T
28 February 2001

 

The National Security Adviser: A Presidential Perspective

With a new administration in power for just over one month, many are asking: Who will be the president’s top foreign policy advisor?  Will the National Security Advisor or the Secretary of State emerge as the most influential?  Kevin V. Mulcahy and Harold F. Kendrick, examine the role of the National Security Adviser in presidential administrations in their article, “The National Security Adviser: A Presidential Perspective.”

The National Security Council, created by the National Security Act of 1947, over time, has become a permanent fixture in the creation of foreign policy.  Mulcahy and Kendrick cite that this is due to four factors:  the NSA frequently shares the president’s perspective and their fate is tied to the president’s; the White House as the center of both domestic and foreign policy creates an integration of the policies, therefore the NSA works closely with domestic advisors; the focus of foreign policy has broadened and the State Department does not have the expertise for this diversity nor the power to assert its dominance; and it is impossible for the Secretary of State to compete with the fact that the NSA’s office is located in the White House.  

Mulcahy and Kendrick define four roles that an NSA can play: Administrator, Coordinator, Counselor, and Agent.  Each of these is rated differently on two responsibilities scales: an administrator has low policy making and implementation responsibility; a coordinator had low policy-making responsibility and high implementation responsibility; a counselor had low implementation responsibility and high policy-making responsibility; and an agent has both high implementation responsibility and high policy making responsibility (Mulcahy and Kendrick 58).  Mulcahy and Kendrick suggest that the coordinator and counselor are the best roles for the NSA (65); the administrator may prove too weak and the agent may be too strong and interfere with the foreign policy mechanisms.

Because both the NSA and the Secretary of State fight for influence in foreign policy, the power of the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State is necessarily an inverse relationship.  It may be to early to judge George W. Bush’s approach to the power of the National Security Council though Condoleezza Rice, NSA, may prove to fill the counselor role.  She has a largely personal relationship with the president; she is a personal friend of the president.  Because of Rice’s status as a personal friend and advisor and Bush’s relative inexperience it is likely that she will become an influential adviser. Rice’s media role thus far has been prevalent; she has been acting largely as a spokesperson for the president’s foreign policy.  Additionally, because of her status as the first woman NSA, it may be difficult for her to fade into the background.  

Having two knowledgeable and experienced foreign policy leaders in the two top positions creates a large potential for conflict between NSA, Rice, and Secretary of State, Colin Powell.  Rice’s views are more mainline Bush polices and she owes loyalty to the Bush family and the administration.  Powell, however, owes little loyalty to Bush or the administrations; it is possible that he would have been appointed Secretary of State even if Bush had not won the election.  Powell is already challenging the positions of the Bush Administration.  

The Clinton administration foreign policy was plagued by inexperience and disorganization—largely until Madeline Albright—and the Reagan administration had a rogue NSC that created the Iran-contra problems.  Even with a conflict it seems that the Bush administration is well prepared to correct the failings of the past.  Rice appears to take the role of adviser seriously and her high profile would make it difficult for her to step outside of the boundaries of acceptability.  Largely, she may be checked by the strength of Secretary Powell. But ultimately, the president will determine the role of the NSA and the Secretary of State: “The structure and successful management of national security policy making is fundamentally a presidential responsibility” (Mulcahy and Kendrick 67).  Reagan caused many of his own problems by allowing his NSA to keep him in the dark.  Though inexperienced, Bush appears to have a good grasp on foreign policy and is genuinely interested in guiding the larger policy; however, his admiration and modeling of Reagan may lead him to some of the same pitfalls if the people filling the spots of the NSA and Secretary of State change.

Bibliography

Mulcahy, Kevin V. and Harold F. Kendrick.  “The National Security Adviser: A Presidential Perspective.”  Readings in the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy . Jerel A. Rosati.  Harcourt Brace College Publishers: Fort Worth, 1998.